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A grant of accelerated review has brought the new Watergate tapes 
controversy to the Supreme Court for decision this summer. The main dispute 
is over Special Prosecutor Jaworski's need for additional presidential tapes to 
prepare for Watergate-related trials and President Nixon's reliance on execu-
tive privilege in resisting a subpoena. But with the President's surprise attack 
on Mr. Jaworski's authority to sue the President, new and relatively unexplored 
issues have been raised. Two authorities, Professors Bickel and Bator, have 
exchanged conflicting views on the issue in the New York Times.1 Although 
providing a framework for discussion, these articles, we believe, indicate a 
need for a response and a fuller analysis than OpEd. columns allow. 
Professor Bickel reluctantly concludes that the President's defense is 
valid, because the Special Prosecutor is simply another government attorney, a 
subordinate to the President, who alone has final legal authority to resolve the 
controversy over the tapes regardless of what the Court does. Professor Bator 
reaches the opposite conclusion, in part by analogizing this case to other law 
suits between government agencies and invoking the tradition of regarding 
public officials as private individual wrong-doers. The issues lend themselves 
to a clearer and different exposition. Mr. Jaworski's authority to sue .the 
President poses two distinct questions: ( 1) whether his competency to repre-
sent the United States against the President is properly confirmed by law, 
and (2) if so, whether such a law constitutionally can confer such authority. 
The first issue is not difficult. A Justice Department regulation,2 which 
assuredly has the force of law as well as solemn political commitment, grants 
the Special Prosecutor powers and responsibilities that compel recognition of 
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1. Bickel, On Mr. Jaworski's Quarrel With.Mr. Nixon, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1974, 
at 41, col. 1; Bator, Disputing Mr. St. Clair on the Jurisdictional Isme, N.Y. Times, 
May 30, 1974, at 37, col. 1; Bickel, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1974, at 30. 
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his authority to enforce subpoenas against anyone in possession of relevant 
evidence, including the Presidet:J.t. The Special Prosecutor's express powers 
include "full authority for investigating and prosecuting offenses" related to 
Watergate, including "allegations involving the President, members of the 
White House staff or Presidential appointees." It also empowers him "to 
contest the assertion of Executive Privilege," to review "documentary evidence 
available from any source" and to apply for subpoenas or other court orders. 
It is clear from preceding events that the power to contest executive privilege 
primarily refers to lawsuits against the claimant of the privilege, the Presi-
dent,3 lest we are to believe that' the provision merely endorses debates with 
the President over evidence, and that the powers of investigation and prosecu-
tion are virtual nullities without compulsory process to obtain relevant evidence. 
The authority claimed by Jaworski is thus squarely within his expressly 
delegated powers.4 
The real question therefore concerns the constitutional effectiveness of this 
delegation, and it is this question that we shall address in some detail. That the 
delegation is from the Attorney General and therefore the Special Prosecutor 
is, like the Attorney General, a member of the executive branch creates the 
occasion for this issue, but does not, contrary to Professor Bickel's suggestion, 
resolve it. Nor does it help to avoid it, as Professor Bator does, by invoking 
the tradition that the President stands as a private wrong-doer who has 
invaded the legal rights of the complainant. We turn first to this argument. 
I. THE PRIVATE WRONG-DOER FICTION 
The private wrong-doer ficti~n allows a plaintiff to challenge an official's 
claim of immunity for government action by a threshold showing that were 
the defendant a private person, his conduct would be a private wrong, an 
interference with interests protected by common law, say a tort or breach of 
3. Conceivably officials other than the President might invoke executive privilege for 
evidence in their possession. But President Nixon had announced that executiVe privilege 
would not be asserted without his personal approval. H carings On Executive Privilege: 
The Withholding of Information by the Excc11tivc Before The Senate Subcommittee on 
Separation of Powers, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1971). Moreover, much of the evidence 
relevant to the Watergate investigation was in the White House and the President had 
left little doubt that he would exercise control over material that he deemed privileged, 
thereby rendering himself the only available defendant in a lawsuit to contest executive 
privilege. By virtue of the first controversy over the tapes, all of this was well known 
at the time the new regulation concerning Mr. Jaworski was promulgated. Sec gl!llcrally, 
Hearings on The Special Prosecutor Before The Senate Committee On The l11diciary, 
93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on The Special 
Prosecutor]. 
4. Then Acting Attorney General Robert Bork testified before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that: 
Although it is anticipated that Mr. Jaworski will receive cooperation from the 
White H ousc in getting any evidence he feels he needs to conduct investigations 
and prosecutions, it is clear and understood 011 all sides that he has the power to 
usc j11dicial process to p11rsuc evidence if disagreements sho11ld develop. H carings 
on The Special Prosecutor, supra note 3, at 450 (emphasis added). 
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contract. Thereupon the burden shifts and the defendant must justify his 
action by showing that it was authorized by la\v. 5 Thus Professor Bator cor-
rectly notes that the doctrine has the effect of denying a defendant his official 
identity and defenses for the purpose of ~stablishing a plaintiff's standing to 
sue, a convenient fiction where the defendant's attack on the plaintiff's authority 
to sue is based on his office. But Professor Bator fails to recognize that the 
President's attack on Mr. Jaworski's authority to sue_ cannot be answered by 
reference to a violation of the private law, ·for the simple reason that Mr. 
Jaworski himself sues as a public official asserting a claim on behalf of the 
United States. Suing in his official capacity as prosecutor, he cannot make the 
threshold showing that the President has invaded his common law rights. 
Since the President has committed no private wrong, he cannot be stripped 
of his official character. Someone must claim that an individual has committed 
a tort before the Court can proceed to regard him as a tortfeasor. Thus the 
President's claim regarding Mr. Jaworski's lack of authority to sue him, which 
of course emanates from his position as President, remains intact, and the 
threshold constitutional issues remain unresolved. 
The objections to Mr. Jaworski's authority urged by Professor Bickel 
arise out of constitutional limitations in either article II, establishing the 
executive branch, or in article III, limiting the judicial power to cases and 
controversies. Claims under one or the other are not easily separable, so that, 
for example, a defect in executive power might render the dispute beyond the 
case-or-controversy requirement. The focus of the arguments under these 
articles differ, however, and hence we shall discuss them separately, beginning 
with the "executive power." 
II. ARTICLE II CoNSTRAINTS 
A. Intra-Executive Disputes 
The meagre textual provisions of article II enumerate the powers and 
duties of the executive branch and by way of introduction vest the executive -
power in a President. This, it may be argued, establishes one officer who "shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" and thus contemplates the 
executive branch as a single indivisible entity, a unitary family headed up by 
the President, from whom all executive authority is derived. In this view, 
Mr. Jaworski, along with the Attorney General and other executive officers, 
exercise the President's authority. The prosecutor's disagreement with the 
President over the tapes is a dispute within the President's family, to be re-
solved there and nowhere else. 
5. E.g., Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939) ; 
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620-23 (1912). See also Albert, Standing to 
Challenge Administrative Actio1l: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE 
L.J. 425,432-438 (1974). 
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Other constitutional provisions, history, and the realities of modern gov· 
ernment ought to guide us around this metaphorical trap. Article II itself 
belies the contemplation of such a neat hierarchy by providing that 11the Con· 
gress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of depart· 
ments."6 "Inferior officers" include, at the least, all executive personnel save 
for diplomatic representatives and cabinet members. This provision also con· 
fers authority in Congress to limit the removal power to the appointing officer 
and, in case of non-presidential appointees, to impose restrictions on remova1.7 
Indeed, it was pursuant to legislation (presumably enacted under this con-
stitutional grant of power) that vests the functions of the Justice Department 
and the issuance of regulations for its governance in the Attorney General, 
that he, and not the President, established the Office of Special Prosecutor, 
appointed Mr. Jaworski, and specified his term of office. And the controlling 
effect of such an arrangement was apparently recognized earlier when the 
President, instead of directly dismissing Special Prosecutor Cox, sought to 
find an Attorney General to remove him from office. 
Similarly, although article II charges the President with the faithful ex· 
ecution of the laws, it is well accepted that Congress may impose on 11presi-
dential" officers powers and duties to make decisions and carry out programs 
which are not subject to the President's control.8 It is also familiar learning 
that Congress may establish "independent" administrative agencies to carry 
out major legislafive programs without accountability to the President and 
without presidential control over the terms of office of their heads.9 Why are 
these not part of the "President's family," since, under any interpretation of 
the term, they exercise considerable executive power? The answer seems to 
be that the combination of functions and the subject matter they regulate 
render insulation from presidential control functionally justified. These 
agencies may be empowered to sue or be sued by 11classically executive" de-
partments, hardly corroborating the proposition that it's all in the family.10 
Conversely, even the Department of Justice, the litigating arm of the United 
6. U.S. CoNST, art. II, § Z. See also, E~ parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880). 
7. It has been assumed that the official with the power to appoint has the power to 
remove, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), but that Congress may restrict 
removal of non-presidential appointees, sec United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 {1886). 
8. E.g., Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 522 (1838) ; State H1ghway 
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973). See also L. ]AFFE, JuDICIAL CoNTROL 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 540-41 (1965). The President may direct his subordinate's 
performance only within the range allowed by statute. When Congress reduces or 
eliminates discretion, the power of direction is without force. For a discussion of legislative 
specificity, see CoM~ISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE 
GovERNMENT, CoNCLUDING REPORT S-9 (1949). 
9. E.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Wiener v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). Sec also L. ]AFFE, supra note 8, at 21 & 541. 
10. E.g., United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491 (1970) ; United States ex rei. Chapman 
v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953); United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949). Sec also 
L. ]AFFE, supra note 8, at 541-42, where Professor Jaffe argues against: 
the impression that the Chapman case is simply a corollary of the independent-
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States, may be required to execute the laws by seeking relief before specialized 
quasi-executive agencies rather than the regular courts.U 
Intra-governmental suits cannot be permissible for "administrative" 
agencies but not for executive departments, since these bodies cannot be 
generically distinguished by plausible separation of powers principles. The 
former "execute" congressional mandates and the latter may engage in rule-
making, enforcement and adjudication. Agency heads are presidential ap-
pointees and some enjoy no greater legal protection from summary removal 
than many executive officials. Executive influence over the two types of bodies 
does not differ significantly. In sum the executive branch comprises a variety 
of public bodies and officials representing diverse interests. Some intra-executive 
disputes may be inappropriate for the courts, as when an official or decision is 
by law subject to the President's discretion. But it is implausible to view 
article II as a general bar against adjudication of legal disputes among these 
bodies. 
There remains, of course, the question of Mr. Jaworski's particular dele-
gated authority to so litigate. Under article II, its validity seems to depend on 
the answers to two questions: First, does the authorization by the Attorney 
General of the power to investigate and prosecute in the name of the United 
States unlawfully delegate the "executive power"? Second, if this delegation 
is lawful, does it cease to be so when Mr. Jaworski takes action inconsistent 
with the President's desires or implicit directives, assuming for this analysis 
that the President could cause his discharge or the abolition of his office? 
B. Excessive Delegation of Executive Power 
We may allow that by virtue of the exclusivity of the impeachment clause, 
the Attorney General lacks power to prosecute--to seek a criminal conviction 
of-the President, and consequently he may not delegate such authority. Per-
haps a delegation by an executive official contrary to a statutory prohibition, 
or in some circumstances one without statutory authorization, or even, dis-
tending our imagination, of some awesome and wide-ranging power (even 
with statutory authorization) unsupportable by a cogent justification might 
raise significant constitutional issues. But any horribles that we might imagine 
to test the outer limits of executive delegation under article II are not remotely 
approximated in the case at hand. And, as a general rule, the executive power 
as understood by the Framers and reflected in our history is basically com-
agency doctrine, so that were it abandoned the ground of the case would fall 
completely away. "The public interest," as much as it is the end product of 
official action, is seen as the process of accommodating the interests pressing for 
representation. This tends to proliferate centers of authority. . . . The public 
interest no longer can be limited to one mask worn by the Attorney General. 
The United States may incestuously sue itself. 
11. E.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). 
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prised of management, administration and enforcement functions-all of which 
contemplate delegated responsibilities.12 
The Attorney General has clear statutory authority to investigate and 
prosecute all officialdom on behalf of the United States,l3 and to delegate func-
tions to others.14 While it is not legally relevant, since the Attorney General, 
not the President, is statutorily authorized to prescribe regulations for the 
Justice Department, it is worth noting that the regulation establishing and 
delegating responsibilities to the Special Prosecutor was clearly approved by 
the President, as reflected in the regulation itselfY1 The authority delegated by 
the Attorney General to the Special Prosecutor is precisely defined and lim-
ited by subject matter and time, and in light of all these circumstances, there 
is simply no good reason to regard it as an unlawful delegation of executive 
power. Moreover, here, as in other instances impuguing the metaphor of the 
indivisible executive family, the arrangement is functionally justified: the ex-
ercise of the Attorney General's delegation power is uniquely appropriate in 
a special area where he has reason to believe that he, other high government 
officials, and the President himself may have interests inconsistent with the 
fair administration of justice. And nothing in or reasonably inferable from 
article II suggests that the delegated functions cannot extend to all appropriate 
and reasonably necessary modes of executing the laws in this special area, thus 
encompassing the power to enforce subpoenas against executive officials, the 
. President included. 
C. Effect of the President's Disapproval of the Special Prosecutor's Actions 
Mr. Jaworski's authority to sue the President does not become defective 
under article II because, we may again assume, the President has implicitly or 
explicitly instructed him to cease and has the lawful power to cause the At-
12. With regard to the notion of "excessive executive delegation" in general, though, 
we would surely want to avoid replicating the history of article I's "delegation doctrine," 
not only because of the doctrine's proven unworkability, but also because however cogent 
its rationale for legislative power, for the above reasons it is quite inapplicable to executive 
power. 
13. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 515 (a), 535 (1970). The recent prosecution of former Vice 
President Agnew rather pointedly illustrates the reach of these powers. 
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 510, 515(a) (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). 
15. Heari1~gs on The Nomi11ation of William B. Saxbe To Be Attormy Geueral 
Before The Seuate Committee on the htdiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 24-25, 30-35, 44, 
84-86 (1973). 
The regulation provides in pertinent part: 
In accordance with assurances given by the President to the Attorney General 
that the President will not exercise his Constitutional powers to effect a · 
discharge of the Special Prosecutor or to limit the independence that he is 
hereby given, the Special Prosecutor will not be removed from his duties except 
for extraordinary improprieties on his part and without the President's first 
consulting the Majority and the Minority Leaders and the Chairmen and ranking 
Minority Members of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and ascertaining that their consensus is in accord with his 
proposed action. 
38 Fed. Reg. 30738. See also the testimony of then Acting Attorney General Robert Bork, 
Hearings on The Special Prosec11tor, supra note 3, at 450, 492-93. 
HeinOnline  -- 74 Columbia Law Review 551 1974
1974] SUBPOENAING THE PRESIDENT 551 
tomey General to discharge him or abolish his office. These alleged powers of 
discharge and abolition are not relevant. The President's potential conflict of 
interest is one of the justifications for the delegation, not a source of its in-
validity. Had he chosen, or should he later choose, to exercise these powers, it 
would be clear to all that he had changed his mind again, that he no longer 
agreed that the Special Prosecutor could contest executive privilege. In chal-
lenging the constitutional authority of Mr. Jaworski to enforce subpoenas 
against him, however, the President has chosen not to exercise these powers of 
revocation. Instead, under the claim asserted, the President would presumably 
have to concede the apparent grant of authority but would say that such a 
grant is unlawful under the Constitution. That is a considerably different legal 
as well as political proposition from rescinding Mr. Jaworski's authority. 
If Mr. Jaworski's authority becomes defective under article II because 
the President does not wish to be sued and has the unexercised power to work 
his will, it would follow that presidential firing and revisory powers render 
any executive official's action beyond the scope of the official's constitutional 
authority whenever the President disagrees with such action. This would be 
patently absurd, since it would transform the President's unexecuted wishes 
into law. Imagine, for example, a private lawsuit turning on a regulation duly 
issued by the Secretary of the Interior, who was authorized by statute to is-
sue such a regulation. The defendant claims that the regulation is unconstitu-
tional under article II because the President has made a public statement de-
ploring it and threatening to fire the Secretary, who refuses to rescind it. The 
validity of this defense obviously turns on the question whether the "law" 
governing the case is the duly promulgated and unrescinded regulation or the 
President's public statement, and the answer is obvious.16 Similarly a presi-
dential directive to the Attorney General to drop proceedings against a parti-
cular defendant (like ITT) would not, should the Attorney General take a 
different view of his responsibility, count as a legal defense to the charge. 
Perhaps both of these decisions are, and should be, within the President's 
political authority, which can be asserted by his reserve power to remove 
cabinet members and at times to issue executive orders. As far as article II is 
concerned, however, presidential wishes and unexercised powers simply can-
not impair the legality of executive action of which he dis!lpproves. The cus-
tomary norms of executive department cooperation and coordination, coupled 
with the President's executive regulations and firing powers, obviously enable 
him to keep his "family" in order without more in the ordinary operations of 
the executive branch. Mr. Jaworski's suit does not arise out of the ordinary 
functioning of the executive, but this is no reason to read article II as con-
16. L. ]AFFE, supra note 8, at 364. Cf. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) 
(The Attorney General could not direct the Board of Immigration Appeals how to 
decide a particular matter, although the regulations under which the Board operated 
were promulgated by him and its members served at his pleasure.) 
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ferring on the President the most extraordinary of powers, transforming his 
ultimate reserve authority into law. Mr. Jaworski has not been fired, nor has 
his authority been lawfully rescinded. That is all there is to it. 
To this point we have assumed the President's lawful power to cause Mr. 
Jaworski's firing or the abolition of his office. The terms and character of the 
delegation make clear, however, that the Special Prosecutor was not intended 
to be just another attorney in the Justice Department; his office is an institu-
tion with substantial operating independence from Justice and the Presidency, 
and his tenure is purportedly granted special protections. If the President 
should attempt to have Mr. Jaworski fired or the regulation rescinded, and if 
someone should then claim that either of these actions was beyond his powers, 
a more difficult article II claim might arise.17 But that is not this case. 
III. ARTICLE III CoNSTRAINTS 
We have explored the extent to which article II is a barrier to the judicial 
resolution of intra-executive lawsuits. Where, as here, a delegation authorizes 
lawsuits, litigation pursuant to such authority, like all other litigation, must 
also satisfy the complex of doctrines which define the subject matter of proper 
judicial business, summed up in the article III provision restricting judicial 
power to "cases or controversies." Several of these. doctrines have been sug-
gested as a bar to Mr. Jaworski's suit, but the nature of the defect is elusive. 
A. Standing 
Professor Bickel has suggested a lack of "standing," the shorthand term 
generally used to denote the requirement that there be something at stake be-
tween the parties to a lawsuit, that they have an interest in the outcome of the 
proceeding. There is obviously no lack of adverse interest or concreteness in 
this litigation. Simply put, Mr. Jaworski wants the subpoena for the tapes. 
enforced, Mr. Nixon wants a presidential privilege and his tapes, and the 
Court's judgment determines who gets what. That is a textbook instance of 
constitutional standing. 
B. Finality 
More recently Professor Bickel has suggested that the "finality" element 
of case or controversy is not satisfied because the President's legal authority to 
fire Mr. Jaworski or revoke the promises made to him affords the President 
the ultimate power of decision. The opinion of the Court would be advisory. 
As with many elements of case or controversy, the rationale behind the finality 
requirement is not entirely clear.18 It may be seen to relate to the insulation 
17. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) ; Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 
(1957). See also note 14 supra. 
18. Professor Bickel has himself acknowledged elsewhere that the finality requirement 
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and independen_ce of article III courts, in a way analogous to the Constitution's 
guarantees of life tenure and an irreducible salary. Subjecting court rulings on 
particular issues to review by the executive or Congress would expose the 
judiciary to another form of pressure or influence, arguably no less offensive 
because indirect.19 The requirement also serves to maintain courts as the 
forum of last resort for the resolution of disputes, thus efficiently allocating 
judicial resources and impressing upon the judiciary the responsibility of final 
decision. Since non-final decisions may be disregarded or nullified by a re-
visory authority, the requirement may also be seen as resting on some of the 
policies that are thought to make advisory opinions objectionable.20 But there 
is no need for elaboration here. None of these considerations are implicated 
by the lawsuit over the tapes. 
1. The Finality Cases. Finality objections have been rare and at times 
have been improper substitutes for other jurisdictional doctrines, such as politi-
cal question.21 Given the generality and elusiveness of the underlying rationale, 
we would expect to find that the cases are replete with ambiguity, fine distinc-
tions and apparent inconsistency. But some themes can be discerned. The 
clearest and most effective finality objection historically occurred when a court 
was asked to decide a case in which judgment or decision would be without the 
force of law unless or until a non-judicial official approved.22 Where such ex-
ecutive or legislative review was or might have been necessary in order to im-
plement a judicial resolution, the courts seemed to regard the judicial exercise 
as "advisory," that is, as amounting simply to a recommendation to some other 
official not only with final auth~rity but final responsibility to act. A decision 
would also likely be regarded as non-final when the revisory authority extends 
to the very issues to be determined by the court, or to matters inextricably in-
tertwined with these issues. Historical examples include situations where 
judicial judgments awarding war damages were to be credited by an executive 
official if "just and equitable"23 and where judicial pension awards were to be 
"is a matter of degree," "the least . . . important or maintained element of case or 
controversy." A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGERous BRANCH 117 (1962). 
19. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); D. CuRRIE, FEDERAL 
CouRTS 6-7 (1968). 
20. A. BicKEL, stepra note 18, at 117. 
21. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), 
see text accompanying note 25 infra, seems a rather clear example. See L. JAFFE, supra 
note 8, at 102. 
22. This appears to be the rationale of early cases denying judicial participation in 
the adjudication of damage claims against the United States. E.g., Gordon v. United 
States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864) (Mr. Justice Taney's statement on announcing 
the opinion is set out in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND 
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL CouRTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 97 (2d ed. 1973), and his full 
draft opinion at 99); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852). Sl!e also 
District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (190J). These cases appear to have been 
restricted by more recent decisions. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) ; 
United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886). It also seems to be the basis of Rayburn's 
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), discussed briefly in note 24 i11jra. 
23. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40,45 (1852). 
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disregarded if based on a "mistake."24 More recently the Court suggested fi-
nality as a barrier to review of Civil Aeronautics Board recommendations of 
awards of foreign air routes, since such awards are subject to a final unre-
viewable approval by the President on foreign policy grounds.25 But judicial 
enforcement of Mr. Jaworski's subpoena obviously does not fail as non-final 
under these precedents. 
2. Permissibility of Nullifiable Final Judgments. Should Mr. Jaworski 
win in the Court, the President could, arguably at least, lawfully nullify that 
victory by causing the firing of Mr. Jaworski, or abolition of his office. But the 
constitutional doctrine of "finality" does not require that the party prevailing 
on a claim ultimately obtain that which he seeks in the lawsuit. Legions of 
cases establish that the party who prevails may in the end and for lawful rea-
sons not receive the fruits of success. The victory may be nullified by subse-
quent judicial, legislative or executive action. Thus the courts exercise juris-
diction over naturalization proceedings although the decree awarding citizen-
ship may be cancelled in a subsequent denaturalization proceeding brought by 
the Government, even where the grounds for denaturalization were known to 
the Government and argued unsuccessfully in the earlier naturalization pro-
ceJ!ding. 26 To the same effect, courts may review a Patent Office denial of a 
patent and order its issuance, though the validity of the patent rater may be 
impeached in a private infringement suit. 27 
The rule is not different because the event altering or nullifying the effect 
of a judgment is within the discretion of a non-judicial branch of government. 
The Court has reviewed the Attorney General's statutory authority to suspend 
deportation despite the objection that, since the effectiveness of an order sus-
pending deportation for more than six months is conditioned on approval by 
Congress, such orders are only recommendations to Congress.28 Substantial 
exercises of congressional control over judicial judgments have neither been 
held to be invalid as an undue inteiference with judicial power nor to deprive 
the courts of jurisdiction. That Congress has to enact a special act of appro-
priation for any judgment against the United States for over $100,000 did not 
prevent acceptance of the Court of Claims as an article III court. Mr. Justice 
Harlan found that disputes resolved there were not beyond the judicial power, 
24. Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). The relevant sections of the Act 
there involved are set out in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, 
supra note 22, at 86. Section 4 authorized the Secretary of War to deny pensions to judicially approved applicants if he suspected "imposition or mistake." 
25. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 
(1948). 
26. See, e.g., Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926) ; United States v. Ness, 
245 U.S. 319 (1917). But cf. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960). 
27. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) ; Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U.S. 79 
(1945). The Court had earlier ruled that such suits could not be heard in its appellate 
jurisdiction, see Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 698-70 
(1927). 
28. E.g., McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950). 
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even though "Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, vests exclusive responsibility for appropria-
tions in Congress," thus making judicial enforcement dependent on congres-
sional authority.29 The Court bas also afforded acts of Congress the effect of 
reopening and modifying judicial judgments.30 And court rulings have upheld 
private bills favoring individual litigants by nullifying final judgments that 
ruled in favor of a public right, such as judgments against taxpayers in favor 
of the Treasury,31 or requiring the removal of obstacles to navigation.32 Acts 
of Congress impugning specific decisions of the Court of Claims have also 
been given effect.aa 
There are analogous instances within the executive branch. A party chal-
lenging an administrative or executive determination in a federal court may 
establish that the agency illegally deprived him of a benefit, yet face a remand 
so that the agency can determine whether there are other, lawful, grounds on 
which to deprive him of the same benefit. For instance, the almost unlimited 
and unreviewable discretion of the Attorney General to subsequently deny 
suspension of deportation does not preclude judicial review of whether the 
challenged denial rests on an erroneous legal foundation.34 The Court might 
have held that since the Attorney General could, after judicial intervention, 
come to any conclusion he chose, judicial action was merely advisory. But, as 
Professor Jaffe points out, judicial review of legal questions relevant to the 
exercise of highly discretionary power is well accepted.35 
Nor do the President's own general powers over executive officials affect 
finality. Let us assume that the hypothetical private lawsuit in which the legal 
issue turned on a dispute between the Secretary of the Interior and the Presi-
dent involved only a claim for prospective injunctive relief. The "reserve" 
powers of the President to work his will (most readily by firing the Secretary) 
would, rather clearly, not place the suit outside federal jurisdiction as "non-
final," any more than the circumstance that the Secretary himself might later 
change his mind and the regulations. Similarly, the President's unexercised 
reserve authority can have no greater or different effect on finality solely be-
cause he appears as the litigant in a lawsuit.36 Finality simply requires that 
29. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962). 
30. See, e.g., 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, modified, 331 U.S. 
795 (1947), 01~ remand, 79 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 
100, 107 (1947); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944). 
31. E.g., Commissioner v. Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). 
32. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856). 
Cf. Bonnar v. United States 438 F.2d 540 (Ct. a. 1971). 
33. E.,., Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. a. 447, pet. 
for writ o mandmmts or prohibition denied, 285 U.S. 526 (1932) ; District of Columbia 
v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901). But cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 
(1872). . 
34. E.g., Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 
(1954), 349 U.S. 280 (1955); Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.Zd 715 (2d Cir. 1966). 
35. L. ]AFFE, supra note 8, at 103. 
36. Finality decisions do not treat party status as relevant; in some cases lacking 
finality, revisory power was not lodged in a party and in others satisfying the require-
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the particular legal controversy to be decided in court not be susceptible of 
lawful revision or review in another agency of government. The Supreme 
Court's resolution of the controversy over executive privilege is plainly not 
subject to review or revision by the President, even on the assumption that its 
judgment might be nullified by subsequent presidential action. 
3. Problems Raised by Attaching Legal Significance to the President's 
Power to Nullify. There are multiple difficulties in attaching legal significance 
to the President's power to have Mr. Jaworski fired or the regulation re-
scinded. The effect of subsequent presidential action on the lawsuit over the 
tapes cannot be ascertained without an assessment of variables, factual and 
legal, that are both complex and speculative. A firing of Mr. Jaworski or 
change in the regulation is manifestly contingent on a variety of future acts, on 
the part of both the President and the then Attorney General, that are not 
overwhelmingly probable. These events also have potential legal effects which, 
though hardly determinable in the abstract, are considerably less predictable 
than Professor Bickel seems to assume. Service v. Dulles,87 for example, casts 
considerable doubt on the legality of an attempted discharge in violation of the 
regulation, and an attempted recission of the regulation as well, at least if done 
by the President acting alone. The revised regulation purports to present con-
siderable legal barriers to dismissal, and contains its own expiration date re-
quiring the Special Prosecutor's concurrence.38 And existing case law does, 
after all, declare the dismissal of Special Prosecutor Cox unlawful.30 
Further, a removal of Mr. Jaworski or rescission of the regulation under 
the President's sponsorship would not necessarily defeat the enforceability of 
the subpoena (should, for example, a new special or regular Justice Depart-
ment prosecutor refuse to desist). Nor is it clear that the courts are without 
power to enforce valid subpoenas, despite these presidential actions, unless the 
pending prosecutions to which the subpoenas relate are dismissed.40 And 
ment a power to affect the ultimate result was within a litigant's authority. Given the 
policies behind the finality requirement, the authority in another official truly to revise 
the Court's decision should defeat jurisdiction whether or not that official is a party, 
while the different power to nullify the effect of a decision ought to be irrelevant no 
matter where lodged. 
37. 354 U.S. 363 (1957). See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959). 
38. The Special Prosecutor will carry out these responsibilities with the full 
support of the Department of Justice, until such time as, in his judgment, he 
has completed them or until a date mutually agreed upon· between the Attorney 
General and himself. 
38 Fed. Reg. 30738 (1973). See also note 15 supra. 
39. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973). 
40. The likelihood of a dismissal (by the government or court) obviously depends 
in part on whether non-compliance with the subpoena can be credibly thought to frustrate 
the defendants' rights to exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). Quite apart from this, however, the trial judge may well have power to himself 
subpoena the tapes (putting aside the executive privilege issue). Rule 614(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence empowers Federal District Judges to call witnesses on their 
own motion, acknowledging the many cases holding this option within their discretion. 
See cases cited in Estrella-Ortega v. United States, 423 F.2d 509, 510-11 (9th Cir. 1970), 
and Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 538 (1959). There would seem no compelling reason to distin-
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finally, of course, the congressional response to this supposed presidential 
course is not foreseeable, any more than the legal effect of ·a variety of mea-
sures that might he enacted to "ratify" the Office of Special Prosecutor, or 
perpetuate the effect of his actions to date. In light of all these contingencies, 
the likelihood of presidential action would seem to impeach the finality of a 
court order enforcing the subpoena about as much as the possibility that Mr. 
Jaworski will change his own mind or resign. 
The Court, were it to adopt Professor Bickel's broad notion of finality, 
would have to resolve the legality of these possible executive, judicial and con-
gressional responses before it could properly determine their effect on its judg-
ment in the case; it could not avoid such decision on the ground that the is-
sues presented are not reviewable. At best such a claim raises further pre-
liminary questions. The reviewability of one such issue, which has the princi-
pal place in the finality argnment, the President's authority to fire Mr. Jawor-
ski, is rather clearly established. There are simply too many cases in which the 
Court has reviewed the lawfulness of removals of government personnel, in-
cluding dismissals by the President, to entertain the argument that Mr. Jawor-
ski's job tenure is within the President's unreviewable prerogatives.41 
Professor Bickel's view of finality would preclude the Court from deciding 
important and no doubt difficult substantive issues presented by the case, like 
the scope of executive privilege. But his view of jurisdiction would also require 
the Court, in these politically charged days, to reach out and resolve a variety 
of novel and difficult issues connected with events that have not yet occurred 
and may never. The Court, for sound reasons, would normally avoid adjudi-
cation until these issues were "ripe" and decision unavoidable. For instance, 
the questions raised by the possibility of the district court maintaining the 
subpoenas after Mr. Jaworski has been replaced are plainly hypothetical ones 
which should not be decided in the abstract. The traditional approach would 
require, for example, a case in which Mr. Jaworski was fired, the district court 
contit;med the subpoena in force, and the President appealed that court's con-
tempt citation. This was almost the situation when Judge Sirica let his order 
stand after the firing of Mr. Cox. The President, instead of challenging the 
order on appeal, chose to comply. The courts were never required to decide 
the issue, because, for good political reasons, the incipient controversy did not 
guish between subpoenaing witnesses and objects, since the court's discretion in both 
instances is based on the rather elementary notion that "Federal Judges are not referees 
at prize-fights but functionaries of Justice." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 
(1948) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting). We assume, of course, that the govern-
ment could block this option by dropping the prosecution, though some have wondered 
whether this form of discretion is itself absolute. E.g., Note, Discretion to Prosecute 
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALE L.]. 1297 (1965). · 
41. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) ; Humphrey's Executor v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
Sec also cases cited in note 37 supra and Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) ; United 
States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886). 
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become concrete. And this illustrates one of the reasons for the tradition 
against premature decisions-issues presented in the abstract are often mis-
perceived because of the political_sontext in which they are presented, and may 
well be decided differently from the way they would in concrete cases. The ef-
fect of Professor Bickel's suggested expansion of standards for finality would 
be to frustrate those traditional rules of restraint which serve the principal 
objective of case or controversy requirements: the adjudication of live issues 
between adverse parties in a concrete context. 
Finally, let us put the most extreme possibility, by assuming that the 
President in his argument in the pending case declares his intent to fire Mr. 
Jaworski or abolish his office, that the Court rules that he would have lawful 
authority to do so, but also rules for the Special Prosecutor on the executive 
privilege issue. The Court's order might then read that, "the President is to 
comply with the subpoena unless within thirty days he discharges Mr. Jawor-
ski or rescinds the regulation establishing his office." While the propriety of 
this order may be questionable, it surely would not lack finality. No existing 
authority could revise the judgment, and judicial orders in the alternative are 
by no means unknown.42 The order following a successful habeas corpus ap-
plication, for example, will typically order the prisoner released 1mless the 
prosecutor determines to reprosecute, a matter within his, and not judicial dis-
cretion. Similarly, a ruling that a student was denied admission or expelled 
from a public university for a constitutionally invalid reason might be en-
forced by an order re.quiring the student's admission or reinstatement 1tnless 
he or she were excludable for some valid reason, like academic qualification.4 !1 
In sum, finality is not really an issue in Mr. Jaworski's suit. 
IV. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY AND EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 
Quite possibly, the President will argue that he is both immune from suit 
and the exclusive judge of executive privilege, and he may characterize these 
issues as "jurisdictional." The immunity claim is that a President is totally 
beyond the reach of judicial process, regardless of the identity of the pl~tintiff 
or nature of the suit. And the broad assertion of privilege is that the Constitu-
tion delegates to the President unreviewable authority to withhold evidence 
from the courts. These broad claims are obviously both central to the merits 
of this lawsuit and raise different issues from those we have discussed. The 
distinction may be blurred, however, because a privilege or immunity adjudi-
cation has the effect of defining the limits, and at the extreme entirely ousting, 
judicial power, thus making the issues appear to be "jurisdictional." But such 
a view of these issues is not clarifying; their resolution is neither preliminary 
42. E.g., Burton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 335 F.2d 317, 
320, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1964). See generally C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE 2651 (1973). 
43. E.g., Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667,671 (1973). 
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nor related to the factors establishing Mr. Jaworski's authority to sue, or to 
finality. 
Rulings sustaining a broad immunity or privilege would not be based 
upon defects in standing, finality or Mr. Jaworski's delegation, but rather on 
distinct inferences from the President's constitutional role and the separation 
of powers. Ultimately such a determination would entail a textual and struc-
tural interpretation of the Constitution, involving considerations quite different 
from those underlying the issues we have discussed. Further, executive privi-
lege and immunity are not rulings that would avoid the important substantive 
issues in the case. They are the broad constitutional questions presented, the 
very substance of the case. However the Court might decide them, it would 
have adjudicated on the merits actual issues necessarily presented by the case 
and not dealt with the shadows of justiciability. 
CoNCLUSION 
No doubt United States v. Nixon is a novel case and perhaps even 
a great one. But it need not satisfy the old saw of making bad law, either in 
respect to settled notions of proper judicial business or the less settled ones, 
such as immunity and executive privilege. And legalisms aside, our resolution 
of the questions respecting Mr. Jaworski's authority to maintain this suit com-
ports with common sense, political expectations and a preferable distribution 
of power within the federal government. 
Following the dismissal of Special Prosecutor Cox, Congress explored 
and considered exercising its legislative powers to create an Office of Special 
Prosecutor, with independence from the President and authority to sue any 
executive official, including the President. Had it ignored the President:s com-
mitments and proceeded in this manner, different constitutional questions 
would arise concerning legislative competency to create and insulate a depart-
ment of government which argnably might be thought "inherently executive." 
Based on Congress' broad power to establish quasi-executive agencies and its 
e:ll..-press constitutional authority to vest the appointing power in the courts, 
such legislation in all likelihood would have been sustained. But one need not 
be Burkian to recognize that this would be a novel and greater exercise of 
power, with more substantial implications for the separation of powers than 
the executive delegation ultimately agreed upon. The precedent would have 
been more far-reaching and perhaps troublesome in its implications. Congress 
refrained in reliance on the President's endorsement of the independence of 
the Special Prosec~tor and of his authority to obtain evidence. We know of no 
persuasive reason to resolve the issue of his authority negatively. To the con-
trary, respecting the terms of the delegation and the commitment to Congress 
allows a sensible flexibility in our institutions of government: the executive's 
own discharge of executive responsibility, without the comparatively greater 
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costs and ramifications of a direct congressional mandate establishing the pros-
ecutor's office. 
Finally, although political expectations and the understanding of the 
American people cannot determine the issues in this lawsuit, the Court should 
certainly avoid artificial rationales which flout our collective sense of justice. 
Had the President chosen (or should he later choose) to exploit one of the 
weaknesses of the compromise by attempting to rescind the regulation or fire 
Mr. Jaworski, he would have indeed incurred the sanction of public opinion 
and ultimately increased the risk of impeachment, as the Congress, the people 
and the President well understand. Everyone also appreciates this would have 
been a very different course from the jurisdictional challenge. It is this dis-
tinction that the Court must maintain. To uphold this attack in reliance on the 
President's hypothetical and unexercised power to fire Mr. Jaworski would be 
to obscure the difference between a constitutional defense and a repudiation of 
unequivocal commitments. That would be to relieve the President of the re-
sponsibility for exercising his own powers, and to do so for no good reason. 
